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 What Do the Folk ! ink about Composition 
and Does it Matter? 
 Daniel Z.  Korman and  Chad  Carmichael 
 Intuitively, a hammer head and the handle to which it is " rmly a#  xed compose 
something. Intuitively, there is nothing composed of your pinky and the moon. 
! eories of composition are sometimes rejected on the grounds that they con-
$ ict with intuitions like these. For example, nihilism— the thesis that there are 
no composites— is widely rejected on such grounds. 
 Parties to these debates commonly frame these sorts of objections in ways 
that suggest that the intuitions at issue are those of non- philosophers, or “the 
folk.” 1  ! is looks to make it an empirical question whether a given theory is 
at odds with the relevant intuitions. David Rose and Jonathan Scha% er (2017 ) 
have taken up the empirical question of what intuitions the folk have about 
composition, and they present some results that purport to show that tele-
ological thinking has a substantial in$ uence on folk intuitions. ! ey take these 
results to impugn those intuitions, which in turn is meant to show that intu-
itions about when composition occurs can pose no threat to philosophical 
theories of composition. If they are right about this, much work in material- 
object metaphysics is undermined, including our own attempts to defend a 
conservative metaphysics of material objects on the basis of intuitions about 
composition. 2  
 Here is how we understand their argument:
 ! e In" uence ! esis : Whether some objects have a collective function has a 
substantial in$ uence on folk intuitions about whether those objects com-
pose something. 
 ! e Debunking ! esis :  If so, then we should not rely on folk intuitions 
about whether some objects compose something. 
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 ! e Liberation ! esis :  If so, then we should not reject theories of com-
position on the basis of intuitions about whether some objects compose 
something. 
 Conclusion : So, we should not reject theories of composition on the basis 
of intuitions about whether some objects compose something. 
 ! e In$ uence ! esis is meant to be supported by a series of survey results. ! e 
Debunking ! esis is meant to be supported by the contention that the folk’s 
teleological thinking is largely “unscienti" c” and “illegitimate.” Finally, the 
Liberation ! esis is motivated by the thought that folk intuitions are the only 
intuitions that could serve as reasons for rejecting theories of composition. ! e 
obvious alternative would be to rely on the intuitions of experts, but Rose and 
Scha% er contend that, because there is so little consensus among metaphysi-
cians, no intuitions have a claim to being  the intuitions of experts. 
 A' er reviewing the aforementioned survey results in  section 1 , we raise 
some concerns about each of the premises. In  section 2 , we challenge the 
In$ uence ! esis, by calling attention to competing explanations of Rose and 
Scha% er’s results. In  section 3 , we challenge the Debunking ! esis by question-
ing whether the putative teleological in$ uences involve an objectionable kind 
of teleology. In  section 4 , we challenge the Liberation ! esis, by showing how 
one can reject theories of composition on the basis of intuitions without relying 
either on folk intuitions or “the expertise defense.” Finally, in  section 5 , we o% er 
some re$ ections on the place of experimental philosophy in metaphysics. ! e 
upshot will be a vindication of intuition- based approaches to material- object 
metaphysics. 
 1.  Four studies 
 We will now brie$ y summarize the four studies that Rose and Scha% er o% er in 
support of the In$ uence ! esis (see 2017: 147–158). In all four, participants are 
presented with a case involving a plurality of things and are asked to provide an 
answer between 1 and 7, where 7 indicates complete agreement that those things 
compose something. 3  
 In the " rst study, participants are presented with a case in which two poli-
ticians are shaking hands. Given just that information, the mean response is 
2.48 (SD = 1.84). When the vignette goes on to say that, by shaking hands, they 
are serving the function of posing for a sculptor, the mean response is 4.86 
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(SD = 1.60). We’ll call these cases  Handshake NF  (‘NF’ for ‘no function’) and 
 Handshake F  (‘F’ for ‘function’) respectively. 
 In the second study, participants are presented with a case in which a 
researcher glues together two previously unheard of objects (“gollywags”). Given 
just that information ( Gollywag NF ), the mean response is 3.85 (SD = 1.94). 
When the vignette goes on to say that they provide excellent back support a' er 
being glued together and placed on a chair ( Gollywag F ), the mean response is 
5.15 (SD = 1.99). 
 In the third study, participants are presented with a case in which two mice 
are glued together. Given just that information ( Mice NF ), the mean response is 
3.0 (SD = 1.73). When the vignette goes on to say that the mice are better and 
faster at detecting explosives when glued together ( Mice F ), the mean response 
is 4.7 (SD = 1.15). 
 In the fourth study, participants are presented with a case in which an ava-
lanche leaves some rocks scattered across someone’s lawn. Given just that infor-
mation ( Avalanche NF ), the mean response is 3.05 (SD  =  1.34). When the 
vignette goes on to say that the homeowner decides to leave them there because 
they make the lawn beautiful ( Avalanche AF , for ‘accorded function’), the mean 
response is 5.05 (SD = 1.77). When the vignette instead goes on to say that he 
 rearranges the rocks in a way that makes the lawn beautiful ( Avalanche DF , for 
‘designed function’), the mean response is 5.84 (SD = 1.52). 
 In all four cases, the added information plainly has a substantial in$ uence on 
the prompted answers. ! e In$ uence ! esis provides a natural account of these 
results. ! e thesis draws further support from additional psychological research 
attesting to people’s general teleological tendencies (see 2017: 141–147). 
 Nevertheless, we are not convinced. In the following section, we explore some 
competing explanations of their results, which we " nd su#  ciently plausible to 
cast signi" cant doubt on the In$ uence ! esis. 
 2.  ! e In$ uence ! esis 
 2.1  Creative intentions 
 ! e with- function and no- function cases di% er with respect to the apparent pres-
ence of functions. But there is a further di% erence between the with- function 
and the no- function cases that underwrites a plausible, alternative account of 
participants’ intuitions, which we will call  the creative intentions account . 
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 To get the idea, let us begin by distinguishing between two ways of thinking 
about a given thing:  (i) as having a function and (ii) as being the product of 
intentions to make something of a speci" c kind. To be sure, these two ways of 
thinking about a thing are closely connected. If one regards an object as having 
been made with an intention that it be a certain kind of thing, it will o' en be 
natural to regard it as serving some function, and vice versa. Can these come 
apart?  We think so. For example, suppose that a child were to stack her stu% ed 
animals in a particular way with the intention of making what she calls an “ani-
mal pyramid.” If asked what it is for, she replies, “It’s not  for anything!” We would 
say that, in that case, the animal pyramid is the product of creative intentions 
but has no function. But, really, it’s neither here nor there whether we’re right 
about this or whether the folk would share our judgment. All that matters is that 
these are two di% erent  ways of thinking about a thing. Even if they turn out to 
be coextensive, they nevertheless underwrite importantly di% erent hypotheses 
about what exactly is accounting for the di% erences in intuitions. 4  
 According to the creative intentions account, what accounts for the di% er-
ences in intuitions is that participants are thinking of the with- function cases as 
involving the relevant creative intentions. (On this view, thoughts of function, 
whether or not participants have them, do not explain the di% erences in intui-
tions.) And indeed, all of the with- function cases, but none of the no- function 
cases, do involve sortal- speci" c creative intentions. In  Handshake F , the sculptor 
and politicians intend to make a model. In  Gollywag F , the researcher intends to 
make a back support. In  Mice F , the researcher intends to make a bomb detector. 
In  Avalanche DF , the homeowner intends to make a rock garden. 5  By contrast, 
 Handshake NF  and  Avalanche NF  involve no creative intentions whatsoever. In 
 Gollywag NF  and  Mice NF , the characters in the vignettes do take themselves to 
have created something, but there is no indication either that there was any par-
ticular kind of thing that they were trying to make, or even that they had creative 
intentions at the time that they were gluing the relevant objects together. 
 Moreover, our creative intentions account of Rose and Scha% er’s results " ts 
well with Paul Bloom’s ( 1996 ) intentional- historical account of folk intuitions 
about artifacts. According to this account, we will tend to have the intuition that 
an object belongs to a given artifactual kind K when we infer (or are informed) 
that it exists as a result of an intention to make a K. 6  Indeed, Bloom ( 1996 :  sec-
tion 2 ) speci" cally argues that the psychological evidence favors this sort of 
account over a teleological account, citing numerous cases in which subjects 
classify things as belonging to a given kind even when they lack the characteris-
tic functions of that kind, and vice versa. 
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 Finally, suppose that Rose and Scha% er are right to suggest that teleologi-
cal in$ uences are illicit (more on this below). In that case, the creative inten-
tions account looks to be more charitable than their teleological account, for 
the latter would then be ascribing to the folk the deeply misguided view that 
collectively having a function is relevant to whether some things compose 
something. ! e creative intentions account, by contrast, ascribes to them the 
view that the presence of creative intentions is relevant to whether some things 
compose something. ! is prima facie plausible view has been championed by 
numerous metaphysicians, who will think that the folk are on to something 
if indeed the intuitions are being in$ uenced by the presence of such creative 
intentions. 7  
 Some will no doubt disagree with us here: they will maintain that what was 
going on inside someone’s head cannot be relevant to whether some things com-
pose something. 8  Suppose they are right. In that case, if the folk’s intuitions are 
in$ uenced by the mere presence or absence of creative intentions, then they are 
making an error that is just as ripe for debunking as the error that the teleologi-
cal account attributes to them. Settling this dispute obviously lies beyond the 
scope of this chapter. But it is a dispute that would have to be settled before we 
could tell whether the creative intentions account could ground a debunking 
argument against folk intuitions. 
 2.2  Answers without intuitions 
 Even if we were to grant that Rose and Scha% er’s results demonstrate the in$ u-
ence of teleology on participants’ answers to survey questions, we would still 
worry that the answers do not express intuitions. It may be that participants are 
giving these answers without having any intuition one way or the other, or it 
may even be that they are giving these answers despite having intuitions to the 
contrary. Either way, the prompted answers would not be expressions of folk 
intuitions about composition. 9  
 ! ere is prima facie reason to think that this really is what is going on. 
We " nd it extremely plausible— partly because of our own experiences in the 
classroom— that participants who have no prior experience with philosophy 
will be confused about how to engage with philosophical questions about com-
position. And the data in several of the studies bear this out. For instance, in 
 Handshake F , over half of participants gave answers of 3, 4, or 5 on a seven- 
point scale, which plausibly indicates some uncertainty. 10  In  Avanlanche NF , 
nearly 40 percent gave such answers. 11  ! is is not at all what one would expect if 
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participants were simply having and reporting intuitions that composition does 
not occur or that it does occur. 
 But if they are not reporting their intuitions, then what are they doing? A natu-
ral answer is that they are thinking through the cases and reporting their consid-
ered judgments, perhaps a' er talking themselves out of their intuitive reactions. 
For instance, as Simon Cullen ( 2010 ) has observed, the use of such scales can 
sometimes exacerbate the problem of answers deviating from intuitions:
 Respondents might interpret the presence of a Likert scale as indicating that 
researchers regard a question as being somewhat complex. When the ques-
tion appears at " rst blush exceedingly obvious . . . this might prompt subjects to 
search for unintended subtleties . . . [W] hen asked a seemingly obvious question, 
people look for an alternative interpretation, one to which they can provide an 
intelligent response. (291– 292) 
 For another illustration of how participants might talk themselves out of report-
ing their intuitions, take  Handshake F . In the vignette, Rose and Scha% er have 
two characters, Liz and Andy, arguing about whether the hand- shaking politicians 
compose something. Liz insists that they do, while Andy insists that they don’t. 
Perhaps, like the two of us, participants begin with the intuition that the politicians 
do not compose anything. But they then start thinking about Liz’s stated reason 
for saying that composition does occur— namely, that the politicians function as 
a model. ! is strikes them as a pretty good reason, perhaps in light of further 
re$ ection on other paradigm cases of composition (tables, chairs, cars). By con-
trast, Andy’s reason for thinking the politicians don’t compose anything falls $ at. 
(He says that merely coming into contact doesn’t su#  ce for composition. But the 
politicians aren’t merely in contact; their hands are clasped together, not so unlike 
the parts of tables, chairs, and cars.) Participants then indicate more agreement 
with Liz than with Andy because they take Liz to have given a better argument, not 
because they have the intuition that the politicians compose something. 
 To be sure, this hypothetical reconstruction of participants’ reasoning still 
involves a teleological in$ uence, insofar as participants are moved by Liz’s rea-
sons. So we are not right here disagreeing with Rose and Scha% er’s claim that 
participants give the answers they do “partly on the basis of considering when 
that plurality serves a purpose” (2017: 147 ). Indeed, we are suggesting that their 
answers may well be based on such considerations  as opposed to being based on 
intuitions. 
 Some may object that it is bad enough if the  answers are in$ uenced by teleol-
ogy. But in fact this will not do for Rose and Scha% er’s purposes. ! eir ultimate 
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goal is to impugn the reliance on intuitions about composition in metaphysics. If 
all they can impugn is the teleological  reasoning that informs the folk’s answers, 
then metaphysicians are in the clear so long as they avoid being led away from 
their own intuitions by such teleological reasoning (more on this in  section 4 ). 12  
 2.3  Imaginative variation 
 Our third worry is that there is every reason to expect that, in some of the stud-
ies, di% erent participants are picturing utterly di% erent things. To see what we 
have in mind, contrast a prompt that reads, “I glued some objects together. Do 
they compose something?” with one that reads, “I glued some boards together 
so that I could use them to $ oat from one island to the next. Do they compose 
something?” ! e second prompt leads us to imagine a ra'  of some kind. ! e 
" rst leaves it entirely open as to how we are to imagine the case— perhaps it was 
an earthworm glued to the end of a blade of grass. Depending on how partici-
pants imagine the " rst case, there are any number of non- teleological di% erences 
between the cases that could explain a di% erence in the responses. 
 Likewise, there can be no expectation that participants given  Gollywag NF  
are picturing even roughly the same thing as participants given  Gollywag F . In 
 Gollywag NF , participants are given no guidance whatsoever either about what 
gollywags look like (only “nobody has ever [before] seen or heard of such a thing” 
(2017: 150–151)) or the way in which they are glued together. Participants could 
be picturing just about anything— perhaps two alien creatures glued together at 
the tips of some of their antennae. In  Gollywag F , by contrast, their imagina-
tive freedom is far more constrained, insofar as they must be picturing some-
thing seat- like that can be placed on a chair and sat on comfortably. 13  Similarly, 
in  Mice NF , participants are given no guidance about how the mice are glued 
together— perhaps one’s tail has been glued to the other’s belly and they are $ ail-
ing around chaotically. In  Mice F , by contrast, they are presumably glued side 
by side and running together like a single eight- legged creature. As in the ra'  
example, given the inevitable imaginative variation, there are any number of 
non- teleological di% erences in how participants imagine the cases that could be 
accounting for the di% erent responses. 14  
 2.4  Suggestive wording 
 Finally, a concern about the wording of some of the vignettes. In  Handshake F , 
participants are told that the politicians “will be providing a model for the 
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sculpture.” Signi" cantly, these words are not put in the mouths of the characters 
in the vignettes (Liz and Andy). Rather, it is the questioners themselves using 
the singular ‘a model’. ! is may lead participants to infer that the question-
ers themselves take the politicians to compose a model, thereby encouraging 
participants to meet the questioners’ expectations by answering in the a#  rma-
tive. Similarly, in  Gollywag F , the questioners say in their own voice that the 
researcher “places the Gollywag- Supporter on his desk chair.” It is not unlikely 
that participants were in$ uenced by the questioners’ use of the singular ‘the 
Gollywag- Supporter’. 15  
 2.5  ! e way forward 
 We have raised a variety of concerns about the di% erent studies. With 
Handshake, we raised concerns about the debating characters and the use of 
the singular ‘a model’. With Gollywag, we were concerned about the use of ‘the 
Gollywag- Supporter’, and in both Gollywag and Mice we were concerned about 
imaginative variation. Finally, in all cases, we were concerned that participants’ 
answers do not express intuitions and that the results were better explained by 
the presence of creative intentions than by the (apparent) presence of collective 
functions. 
 Let us end on a constructive note, indicating how our concerns might be 
addressed in future psychological work on folk intuitions about composition. 
First, if the same vignettes are used in future work, ‘providing a model for’ could 
be replaced with ‘posing for’, and ‘the Gollywag- Supporter’ could be replaced 
with ‘the superglued gollywags’, to address the indicated problems of suggestive 
wording. Second, worries about imaginative variation can largely be dealt with 
by presenting participants with images of the objects under discussion, to help 
ensure that they are picturing the same thing across the di% erent versions of the 
vignettes. ! ird, one can test the hypothesis that it is the di% erences in creative 
intentions that are in$ uencing participants’ intuitions, as opposed to teleological 
di% erences, by examining cases involving artifacts that aren’t for anything. One 
might, for instance, use the aforementioned case of the child who stacks her 
stu% ed animals with the intention of making an “animal pyramid.” When asked 
what animal pyramids are for, she replies (in one version) that they are not  for 
anything or (in another) that they are for scaring o%  the boogeyman. 
 Ensuring that prompted answers express intuitions will likely be more di#  -
cult, and we do not ourselves see clearly how to achieve this. Dropping the debat-
ing characters that appear in some of the vignettes, and asking more directly 
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whether composition occurs, would begin to address some of the concerns we 
raised in  section 2.2 . However, there would still remain the more general worry 
that the questions are so bizarre that participants won’t know what to do with 
them, and that their answers do not express anything that anybody would want 
to call “intuitions.” Perhaps participants can be eased into questions of compo-
sition by training them with some clear cases, in something like the following 
way. ! ey are shown an image of a hammer and told “there is a single thing 
composed of all the things in this picture, since there is something composed of 
the handle and head.” ! ey are then shown a picture of a dog standing by a tree 
and are told “there is no single thing composed of all the things in this picture, 
since there is nothing composed of the tree and the dog.” Participants can then 
be shown further images— with captions giving teleological or non- teleological 
descriptions— and asked to rate their agreement with the claim that there is a 
single thing composed of all the things in the image. 16  Admittedly, this sort of 
training procedure still won’t address many other reasons for worrying that par-
ticipants’ answers do not express their intuitions, and indeed it may introduce 
new problems. 17  
 3.  ! e Debunking ! esis 
 We have thus far been challenging the In$ uence ! esis, according to which there 
are substantial teleological in$ uences on folk intuitions about composition. We 
turn now to the Debunking ! esis, according to which we should not rely on 
folk intuitions about composition if the In$ uence ! esis is true. 
 ! e idea behind the Debunking ! esis is that there is something deeply prob-
lematic about teleology. But if teleology is wrong, we don’t want to be right. Lots 
of things obviously  do have functions— artifacts, if nothing else. ! ere is noth-
ing unscienti" c, illegitimate, or “benighted” about the idea that umbrellas are 
for blocking the rain. If it were only legitimate teleology of this sort that had an 
in$ uence on folk intuitions, we would have little reason to accept the Debunking 
! esis. 
 What reason, then, is there to accept the Debunking ! esis? In their defense 
of the thesis, Rose and Scha% er present psychological evidence indicating that 
the folk have a tendency to engage in clearly illegitimate teleological thinking, 
extending well beyond the realm of human artifacts. For instance, they point to 
studies suggesting that children are willing to give teleological accounts of just 
about anything: pointy rocks are for scratching itches, clouds are for raining, and 
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lions are “for going to the zoo” (2017: 143). Additional evidence suggests that 
the e% ect persists into adulthood, particularly in conditions of cognitive strain 
(2017: 144–145). 
 We of course agree that these are misattributions of function and purpose. 
Perhaps all non- artifactual teleology is illegitimate. Nevertheless, we do not see 
how this is relevant to the cases at hand. In all of the with- function cases, if the 
candidate composers do indeed compose something, what they compose is an 
artifact:  a model for a sculpture, a back support, a bomb detector, or a rock 
garden. 18  
 For these reasons, Rose and Scha% er’s studies should not convince us that folk 
intuitions  about composition involve an unacceptably promiscuous application 
of teleological concepts. Still, they might try to motivate the Debunking ! esis 
by claiming that the aforementioned promiscuity reveals a misunderstanding of 
function, and that, given this misunderstanding, the in$ uence of teleology on 
folk intuitions is always illicit. 
 What exactly is the misunderstanding supposed to be? Rose and Scha% er 
insist that the folk are “teleomentalists,” by which we understand them to mean 
that the folk take functions always to be rooted in intentions or other mental 
states. Perhaps what they have in mind is that, according to the folk’s under-
standing of function, whenever things have functions, there must be agents who 
bestow those functions upon them. Rose and Scha% er (2017: 145) point to evi-
dence that the folk are deeply inclined to believe that animals have the functional 
parts they do (e.g., gira% es’ long necks) because “nature” intended for them to 
have those functions. ! is, we agree, would be a mistake. But it is utterly plausi-
ble that human artifacts have the functions that they do as a result of intentions. 
We don’t see anything wrong with teleomentalism (so understood) as long as it 
is restricted to the realm of artifacts. And, since the studies all involve both arti-
facts  and agents to bestow functions upon them— the sculptor, the researchers, 
the homeowner— there is nothing problematic about this sort of teleomentalist 
understanding of the cases at hand. 
 Alternatively, perhaps what Rose and Scha% er have in mind in calling the folk 
“teleomentalists” is that the folk attribute agential characteristics to the  bearers 
of function. On this view, when the folk claim that an umbrella is for blocking 
rain, they bizarrely think that  the umbrella intends to block the rain. We " nd 
it very hard to believe that the folk think about artifacts in this way. Rose and 
Scha% er may suggest that the view draws some support from people’s general 
willingness to take up “the intentional stance”— as when subjects describe mov-
ing geometric " gures on a screen as “trying to escape” (2017: 146)— though we 
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are skeptical. 19  In any case, this still falls short of establishing the Debunking 
! esis. For the folk would still be correct in thinking that the items in question 
have the functions they do— even if they’re wrong about the source of the func-
tions— in which case it’s unproblematic that (correct) teleological judgments are 
in$ uencing their intuitions about composition. 
 We have just been considering two ways in which the folk might be thought 
to misunderstand teleological concepts, as always involving agential bestowers 
or as always involving agential bearers. A more radical approach to motivating 
the Debunking ! esis is to claim, not that the folk misunderstand teleological 
concepts, but rather that, in thinking of teleology in these ways, they correctly 
understand their own, defective teleological concepts, which do not apply to 
anything at all. By ‘function’, the idea goes, we “serious theorists” express the 
concept function lite , and indeed some things do have functions lite . ! e folk, on 
the other hand, express the concept function heavy , and are mistaken even when 
they say “umbrellas have functions,” for they are wrongly saying that umbrel-
las have functions heavy . But we " nd it completely implausible— on well- known 
externalist grounds (see Burge  1979 )— that the folk mean something di% erent 
from us by ‘function’ (‘purpose’, ‘for’), even if their understanding of teleological 
concepts is substantially di% erent from ours. 
 Here is one " nal way that Rose and Scha% er might try to explain the badness 
of the folk’s teleological tendencies. ! ey might say that the relevant problem is 
the folk’s tendency to give teleological  explanations . While there may be nothing 
wrong in saying that a particular pointy rock is for scratching itches (e.g., if you 
have been using it as an itch- scratcher), there is something wrong with suppos-
ing that it is pointy  because it is for scratching itches. Be that as it may, there 
are cases in which teleological explanations are entirely unproblematic: there is 
nothing unscienti" c about explaining what makes this or that object an umbrella 
partly in terms of the fact that it functions as an umbrella. So the mere fact that 
teleology plays an explanatory role in the folk’s thinking is not itself problematic. 
 Rose and Scha% er might concede that teleological explanations are  sometimes 
correct but insist that teleological explanations  of why composition occurs are 
never correct. And, for what it’s worth, we would agree with that. 20  ! is is in 
part because we think that there are counterexamples to teleological accounts 
of composition (see  section 4 ), and in part because we think that there are more 
promising explanations of why composition occurs when it does. 21  Nevertheless, 
even granting that teleological explanations of composition are wrongheaded, 
this is not enough to secure the Debunking ! esis. For that, we would need evi-
dence, not just that folk intuitions are  in some way in$ uenced by the perceived 
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presence of teleology, but, more speci" cally, that they are in$ uenced by dubious 
teleological explanations. However, the studies do not seem to support anything 
as speci" c as that. 
 In conclusion: ! e Debunking ! esis rests on the idea that folk intuitions 
about composition involve a teleological mistake. We have argued that Rose and 
Scha% er have failed to identify any mistake that the folk are making and that 
is plausibly responsible for their (allegedly) teleologically- in$ uenced intuitions. 
! e folk may indeed be in$ uenced by the assumption that there is teleology in 
the realm of human artifacts, but this is no mistake. And they may indeed have 
mistaken teleological assumptions about the non- artifactual realm, but we have 
no reason to think that those mistakes underwrite their intuitions about Rose 
and Scha% er’s artifactual cases. We see no good reason to accept the Debunking 
! esis. 
 4.  ! e Liberation ! esis 
 We have raised some doubts about both the In$ uence ! esis and the Debunking 
! esis. But suppose these are true and that folk intuitions about composition 
cannot be trusted on account of illicit teleological in$ uences. What does this tell 
us about the metaphysics of composition? Rose and Scha% er contend that, in 
undermining the folk intuitions, they have thereby liberated theories of compo-
sition from any pressure to conform to intuitions. 
 ! e Liberation ! esis : If we should not rely on folk intuitions about whether 
some objects compose something, then we should not reject theories of 
composition on the basis of intuitions about whether some objects com-
pose something. 
 ! e liberation from intuitions about composition is meant to be total: metaphy-
sicians working on theories of composition are supposed to be liberated, not 
only from folk intuitions about when composition occurs, but from  anyone’s 
intuitions about when composition occurs. 
 Why accept the Liberation ! esis? Even supposing that folk intuitions have 
successfully been debunked, why can’t a philosopher rely on his or her own 
intuitions? For instance, we (Chad and Dan) reject nihilism on the basis of the 
intuition that atoms arranged dogwise compose something. We do not accept 
that they compose something on the basis of folk intuitions (i.e., the intuitions of 
non- philosophers). Rather, each of us, neither of whom is any longer a member 
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of the folk, accepts it on the basis of his own intuition that atoms arranged dog-
wise compose something. Other philosophers may accept it on the basis of 
the intuitions that they speculatively attribute to the folk. So much the worse 
for them. 
 Some may object that it is unrealistically optimistic to suppose that our 
intuitions, unlike those of virtually everyone else on the planet, have somehow 
escaped the nearly ubiquitous in$ uence of teleology. But, setting aside our con-
cerns from  section 2 , Rose and Scha% er’s results would seem to provide excellent 
reason for thinking that we do not have the teleologically- infused intuitions that 
they attribute to the folk. We have a clear intuition that the politicians do not 
compose anything in  Handshake F . We have an intuition that the mice do not 
compose anything when you glue them together in  Mice F . We have an intuition 
that no new object comes into existence when the homeowner sees the rocks in 
 Avalanche AF  and realizes that they make his lawn beautiful. We don’t share the 
folk’s alleged intuitions about these cases, which is reason to think that we are 
immune, or at least resistant, to teleological in$ uences. 22  
 Additional evidence of our immunity to teleological in$ uences appears in 
our intuitive reactions to anti- teleological arguments in the literature. Consider 
the following simple teleological account of composition:  some  x s compose 
something i%  the  x s together serve some function. We take this view to have 
been soundly refuted by H. Scott Hestevold:
 Consider a counterexample . . . which will provide a case in which two objects 
together serve the requisite purposive function and yet there is no object strictly 
made up of those two things. ! e purposive function of two- way communica-
tion is served by the two- way radio located at the $ ight- control center at Cape 
Kennedy and by the two- way radio located in a space capsule orbiting on the 
other side of the Earth. Although the [proposed conditions for composition are] 
satis" ed in this situation, the two things [do not compose anything]. 23  
 Hestevold’s counterexample evokes in us (Chad and Dan) an utterly compel-
ling intuition: that the radios do not compose anything. ! e counterexamples 
are even clearer in the other direction. Atoms arranged pebblewise typically do 
not together serve any function. But we have the intuition that they do compose 
something, namely, a pebble. Once again, we have somehow escaped the alleged 
in$ uence of teleology. 
 Recognizing that we do not share the folk’s intuitions about cases like 
 Handshake F  and  Mice F  may give rise to another objection, namely, that intui-
tional disagreement with the folk is a defeater for our own intuitive beliefs. In 
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response, we are happy to grant (at least for the sake of argument) that intui-
tional disagreement is typically a defeater, and even that folk intuitions typi-
cally trump philosophers’ intuitions. But, in the present context, where we are 
supposing that the folk’s intuitions have indeed been debunked, diverging from 
their intuitions cannot be cause for concern. 
 To be clear, we don’t here take ourselves to be invoking the so- called expertise 
defense. 24  We’re not saying that the intuitions of trained philosophers are gener-
ally of higher quality than those of the untrained folk. Nor are we saying that 
our training is in this case responsible for our resistance to the teleological in$ u-
ences. 25  We are not o% ering any hypothesis about the source of our resistance. 
For all we have said here, this may just be a selection e% ect: we have managed to 
become professional philosophers because we lack the teleological tendencies, 
not the other way around. Once again, all we are saying is that, in cases in which 
folk intuitions have been debunked, failing to share the folk’s intuitions isn’t a 
defeater. 
 Finally, one might object that di% erences among  metaphysicians ’ intuitions 
about when composition occurs makes our reliance on our own intuitions 
problematic. 26  Again, we agree that intuitional disagreement can in principle 
be problematic. But do metaphysicians have di% erent intuitions about compo-
sition? To be sure, plenty of them would give di% erent  answers from us about 
whether composition occurs in this or that case. But there is good reason to 
doubt that intuitions about when composition occurs motivate their answers. 
For one thing, these philosophers have been very explicit about why they give 
the answers that they do: because accepting that composition sometimes occurs 
leads to violations of anti- colocation principles, or because accepting composi-
tion in some cases but not others leads to vague existence or intolerable arbitrar-
iness. 27  ! is suggests that their answers to questions about when composition 
occurs are based not on competing intuitions— the intuition that my pinky and 
the moon  do compose something or the intuition that a hammer head and han-
dle  don’t compose anything— but rather on philosophical arguments. 28  
 Of course, the fact that they argue for their answers doesn’t mean that they 
don’t  also have intuitions directly in support of those answers. But if they truly 
did have such intuitions, one would expect to " nd them treating their views 
as natural, intuitive starting points. What one " nds, however, are concessions 
that their views are odd or incredible. Sometimes, these concessions are supple-
mented by attempts to impugn the intuitions that tell against their views. Other 
times, they are supplemented with attempts to show that we have somehow mis-
understood or misdescribed the intuitions that seem to tell against their views. 29  
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! e fact that they go to such lengths to impugn or explain away the intuitions 
strongly suggests that they share our intuitions and accept the views they do 
 despite having the intuitions. 30  
 5.  Experimental philosophy and its place in metaphysics 
 We have cast doubt on the In$ uence ! esis: there is reason to think that some-
thing other than teleology is in$ uencing participants’ answers and reason to 
suspect that the answers don’t express intuitions at all. We have challenged the 
Debunking ! esis by arguing that, to the extent that folk intuitions have been 
shown to be in$ uenced by teleology, it is not teleology of the bad sort but rather 
the completely innocuous sort that we expect to " nd in the world of artifacts. 
Finally, we have challenged the Liberation ! esis by showing that one can rea-
sonably rely on intuitions about composition without having to rely on the intui-
tions of non- philosophers. 
 Let us close with a brief word about how we see the role of experimental 
philosophy in the metaphysics of composition. First, an analogy: You believe 
that it is 4:15 because you check your phone and seem to see ‘4:15’ displayed on 
the screen. You are justi" ed in believing that it is 4:15 on that basis, and you are 
justi" ed despite not having checked in with your neighbor or an optometrist or 
a psychiatrist. Of course, there are things you can learn from these people that 
would undermine your justi" cation. If your neighbor’s phone says that it is 4:51, 
or if an optometrist tells you that your eyes are playing tricks on you, or if a psy-
chiatrist says that you are completely delusional and do not even own a phone, 
it is probably time to suspend belief. ! e point is that, although these investiga-
tions can in principle undermine belief, you can be justi" ed in believing that it 
is 4:15 without undertaking them. 
 Similarly, we think that each metaphysician’s primary evidence for assess-
ing theories of composition is her own intuitions. She does not, for example, 
need to base her belief that nihilism is false on any empirical hypothesis about 
what intuitions the folk have. Nor is there any problem with basing one’s beliefs 
on one’s own intuitions without " rst checking what intuitions the folk or other 
philosophers have. 31  
 ! is is not to deny that revelations about the intuitions of the folk or other 
philosophers  can a% ect our justi" catory status. As mentioned earlier, intuitional 
disagreement can sometimes undermine our intuitive beliefs. Indeed, experi-
mental philosophy can in principle undermine our intuitive beliefs in just the 
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way Rose and Scha% er think: by revealing that they are in$ uenced by factors 
that by our own lights are irrelevant. 32  But so can " nding out that you have taken 
a pill that disrupts your ability to think clearly about composition. Our point 
is that you do not " rst have to investigate and rule out all of these in- principle 
defeaters in order to be justi" ed in forming beliefs about composition on the 
basis of your own intuitions. 33  
 Notes 
  1  See, for example, Sanford ( 1993 : 220) on “naive, commonsense, folk mereology,” 
Markosian ( 1998 : 211) on “standard, pre- philosophical intuitions,” ! omasson 
( 2007 : 128) on “our pretheoretic sense of what objects there are,” Korman ( 2009 ) 
on “pretheoretical beliefs,” Hirsch ( 2011 : 182) on “pre- philosophical assertions of 
commonsense,” and Kriegel ( 2011 : 198) on “folk’s intuitive verdicts.” 
  2  See Carmichael ( 2015 ) and Korman ( 2015 ). 
  3  In some cases, participants are directly asked the extent to which they agree that 
the objects compose something. In others, the vignettes feature two characters 
disagreeing about whether composition occurs, and participants are asked which of 
the two characters they agree with (e.g., on a scale with 1 marked ‘Smith is right’, 4 
marked ‘Neither is right’, and 7 marked ‘Jones is right’). 
  4  Even enemies of teleology should acknowledge the di% erence, since they won’t want 
to think of anything as  having a function , but they will presumably agree that some 
things are  the products of creative intentions . 
  5  Even  Avalanche AF  involves something like, but not exactly like, sortal- speci" c 
creative intentions. No one, in this case, sets out to  make a rock garden, but there at 
least is an intention  that it be a rock garden. ! is may help explain why subjects lean 
more toward pro- composition judgments in  Avalanche AF  than in  Avalanche NF . 
  6  Bloom ( 1996 : 10) suggests an additional requirement that one  successfully bestow 
upon the object features characteristic of the intended kind; cf. ! omasson ( 2003 : 
598). ! is may help explain the di% erent judgments in Rose and Scha% er’s rope cases 
(2017: 162–163). ! ough the di% erences may be better explained in some of the 
ways we described in  section 2.2 and  section 2.3 .  
  7  See ! omasson ( 2003 : section 3.1), Wasserman ( 2004 : 700), Korman ( 2010 : section 
7,  2015 : ch. 8.4), and Evnine ( 2013 ); cf. Baker ( 2000 : 38– 39,  2007 : 11– 13). ! e view 
that the presence of creative intentions is relevant to which objects there are can be 
motivated by re$ ection on cases like the following. When a sculptor deliberately 
chisels a hunk of stone into some statuesque shape, a statue comes into existence. 
But suppose that a meteoroid, as a result of random collisions with
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space junk, temporarily comes to be a qualitative duplicate of some actual statue. 
Intuitively, nothing new comes into existence which, unlike the meteoroid, cannot 
survive further collisions that deprive the meteoroid of its statuesque form. 
  8  See van Inwagen ( 1990 : 12– 13), Rea ( 1998 : 352), and Hudson ( 2001 : 111). 
  9  See Bengson ( 2013 ) who makes a powerful case that answers do not express 
intuitions in many of the most prominent studies in experimental philosophy. Cf. 
Wright (2009,  2013 ) and Cullen ( 2010 ). 
  10  No participants answered 1, three answered 2, two answered 3, seven answered 4, 
six answered 5, four answered 6, and six answered 7. 
  11  Sixteen participants answered 1, nine answered 2, eleven answered 3, nine 
answered 4, two answered 5, " ve answered 6, and four answered 7. 
  12  Cf. Wright ( 2013 : 498). 
  13  ! is is particularly troubling since the experiment uses a between- subjects 
design: the group of participants responding to  Gollywag F  was disjoint from the 
group responding to  Gollywag NF . 
  14  One might object that, if indeed participants are imagining di% erent things, one would 
expect a random distribution in  Gollywag NF  and  Mice NF , which is not what Rose and 
Scha% er found. However, even if the vignettes provide little guidance to participants’ 
imaginations, the resulting imaginative variation is not completely unconstrained. We 
would expect certain psychological defaults here. For example, if asked to imagine a 
dog and given no further guidance, most participants would surely imagine a dog with 
four legs. ! anks to David Rose and Jonathan Livengood here. 
  15  Cf. Cullen ( 2010 : 280– 281) on the in$ uence of seemingly insigni" cant features of 
the experimental design. 
  16  Even better, following Wright (2009), participants could be asked a “yes/ no” 
question about whether composition occurs and then given a scale for rating their 
con" dence in their answer. We think this would go some way toward addressing 
Cullen’s concern about scales (mentioned in  section 2.2 ). 
  17  One potential problem is that it may encourage participants to report judgments of 
similarity between test cases and training cases, as opposed to reporting intuitions 
about the test cases (cf. Bengson  2013 : section 5.1). In addition, the proposed 
training is problematic if we want to leave open whether the folk are nihilists 
or universalists. But it seems reasonable to set nihilism and universalism aside, 
especially in light of Rose and Scha% er’s results on pp. 158–159.  
  18  Some may say that the rock garden is not an artifact in  Avalanche AF . Even if that’s 
true, insofar as it belongs to a kind most of whose instances are designed artifacts 
(viz., rock gardens), it is similar enough to an artifact to render the ascription of 
teleology not clearly inappropriate. 
  19  ! e example of the moving shapes is from Heider and Simmel ( 1944 ). Heider and 
Simmel themselves describe their experiment in mentalistic terms, saying, “a few 
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‘anthropomorphic’ words are used since a description in purely geometrical terms 
would be too complicated and too di#  cult to understand” (245). We suspect that 
participants do so for similar reasons. 
  20  ! ough some would disagree. See Bowers ( manuscript ) for a defense of a 
teleological account of composition; cf. Simons ( 2006 :  section 5 ). 
  21  See Carmichael ( 2015 ) and Korman ( 2015 : ch. 8.4). 
  22  We are also evidently immune to the folk’s alleged tendency to attribute function or 
purpose to everything in nature: we " nd the suggestion that arbitrary pebbles have 
a function or purpose absurd. 
  23  Hestevold ( 1981 : 374). 
  24  See, for example, Weinberg et al. ( 2010 ), Sosa ( 2011 ), Williamson ( 2011 ), and 
Sytsma and Livengood ( 2015 : ch. 4.3) for discussion. 
  25  ! ough we do think that training helps ensure that people report their intuitions 
(rather than other mental states) about p (rather than q) when asked for their 
intuitions about p. 
  26  See Rose and Scha% er (2017: 173). 
  27  See Korman ( 2015 : ch. 2,  2016 ) for an overview of the arguments. 
  28  Of course, the premises of these arguments are themselves motivated by intuitions, 
but not intuitions about whether composition occurs in this or that case. 
Accordingly, the fact that they are moved by these arguments is no indication that 
have di% erent intuitions about which things compose something. 
  29  See Korman ( 2015 : chs. 5– 7) for an overview. 
  30  See Korman ( 2015 : ch. 4.3.3) for more on intuitional disagreement. 
  31  Why then are we always asking each other about our intuitions? O' en, it is 
because we are about to use an intuition- driven argument to convince someone of 
something, and we are checking whether they share the intuitions that underwrite 
the argument. 
  32  ! ough, as we emphasized in  section 4 , it’s far less troubling if all that can be shown 
is that  other people, ourselves not included, are having intuitions that are in$ uenced 
by irrelevant factors. 
  33  ! anks to John Bengson, Zach Horne, David Kovacs, Jonathan Livengood, David 
Rose, Jonathan Scha% er, and Jen Wright for helpful comments. 
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